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1 Introduction 
The project “Small cities, urban environments and governance in India” aims to better understand 
urban environmental governance in India’s non-metropolitan small cities (with populations of c. 
100,000-500,000) in the context of neoliberal reform and decentralization. Research was carried out 
from 2012-2015 in Gujarat and West Bengal with a focus on the municipalities of Navsari (pop. 
282,753) and Amreli (pop. 118,059) in Gujarat as well as Bardhaman (pop. 347,016) and Medinipur 
(pop. 169,127) in West Bengal (population data as per Census of India 2011). 
The urban environment is understood here in a large sense to include urban environmental services 
and amenities, such as water supply, drainage and sanitation, solid waste removal and treatment, 
urban green space, forests and parks. Urban environments in small cities are shaped, among other 
factors, by flows of money, power and ideas. This report focuses on relevant flows of money from 
central and state governments to municipalities – flows that are of course connected with those of 
power and ideas, particularly in the case of central and state development schemes. The report also 
looks at the municipalities’ own revenues and municipal staffing.  
In terms of methodology, we draw upon an analysis of state- and municipal level accounts and 
budget estimates indicating fund allocations, revenue and expenditures related to the urban 
environment. This information was difficult to obtain. We accessed the data in most cases directly 
from state and municipal offices in Gujarat and West Bengal during our fieldwork. This required 
patience and persistence. The collected data has gaps and is not always reliable. Moreover, the 
comparison of municipal-level figures was in some cases problematic because the studied 
municipalities used different accounting systems. Nevertheless, they provide a good indication of the 
financial autonomy of municipalities as well as an idea of state-specific priorities in urban 
environmental governance. Additional secondary data available in reports and on websites was also 
included in the analysis 
This report provides a complementary quantitative data set for a forthcoming publication on 
decentralization, municipal capacity and autonomy related to environmental governance in small 
cities in Gujarat and West Bengal. That publication draws more heavily upon qualitative information 
from interviews at the state and the city level and assesses enabling and constraining factors of 
municipal agency and power in the two states.  
In the following, we present data on centrally-sponsored and state-government development 
schemes related to the urban environment, transfers of untied funds to urban local bodies (ULBs), 
revenue and expenditures of municipalities, and local staffing levels. 
 
2 Centrally sponsored urban development schemes 
At the time of our research, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was 
the most important centrally sponsored scheme implemented in India’s urban areas. It focused on 65 
mission cities (large cities and other urban areas of national importance) and on the creation of 
urban infrastructure (water supply, transportation, etc.) and housing and slum development through 
four sub-missions, two each for the mission cities and for smaller urban centers.  
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Figure 1: Funds released under JNNURM (as per 31.12.2013) 
 Mission cities Smaller cities 
Infrastructure    
Urban Infrastructure and Governance  
(UIG) 
43,200 
(53%)  
Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme of 
Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT)  
11,523 
(14%) 
Housing and Slum Development   
Basic Urban Services to the Poor  
(BUSP) 
18,345 
(23%)  
Integrated Housing and Slum Development 
Programme (IHSDP)  
8,221 
(10%) 
Total 
 
61,545 
(76%) 
19,744 
(24%) 
Source: JNNURM website (National Informatics Centre, Government of India, n.d.) 
 
Although JNNURM focused on large cities (see Figure 1), the scheme had also an important impact 
on smaller cities. Two sub-missions were implemented there: the Urban Infrastructure Development 
Scheme of Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) and the Integrated Housing and Slum Development 
Programme (IHSDP). By the end of 2013, Rs. 11,523 crore had been invested by the central 
government in infrastructure projects for water supply, sanitation, solid waste management, etc. 
under UIDSSMT and Rs. 8,221 crore under IHSDP to build and upgrade houses and provide basic 
infrastructural facilities, such as water taps, latrines, waste containers, sewerage and storm drains, in 
slum areas (National Informatics Centre, Government of India, n.d.). The central government grants 
(80%) were to be matched by 10% from each the state government and the respective municipality.  
The launch of JNNURM implied a significant increase in central funding for urban areas. State-level 
nodal agencies for the implementation, the State Urban Development Agency in West Bengal and the 
Gujarat Urban Development Mission, were reinforced to manage the new centrally sponsored urban 
schemes and implement them with specially hired engineers and other staff.  
Figure 2 suggests that West Bengal and Gujarat were middle performers in the uptake of UIDSSMT 
funds. State officers in West Bengal stated that some projects ran into delays because of problems 
with land acquisitions but eventually all projects received their second instalments, indicating that 
they were properly implemented and co-funded by the state government and the ULBs. Indeed, the 
state was able to attract significantly more central funding under UIDSSMT than originally allocated, 
by a factor of 1.58 (yet, compared with a ratio of 4.04 in the case of Andhra Pradesh). 
 
Figure 2: Central investment in urban infrastructure projects under UIDSSMT (in Rs. crore, as per 
31.03.2014) 
State Allocation Funds released 
Ratio allocated / 
released funds 
No. projects 
completed 
West Bengal 315 497 1.58 18 
Gujarat 352 347 0.99 40 
All India 6400 12730 1.99 453 
Source: JNNURM website (National Informatics Centre, Government of India, n.d.) 
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None of our studied municipalities in West Bengal and Gujarat, nor their corresponding Urban 
Development Authority (UDA) received any significant UIDSSMT grant recently. Bardhaman, for 
example, recorded a failed attempt to obtain central funding for a drinking water treatment project. 
Funding under IHSDP for smaller constructions in slum (relocation) areas has been dispersed to a 
larger number of small cities. Figure 3 indicates that West Bengal received a substantial portion of 
the central funds and was able to complete many constructions. In both Bardhaman and Medinipur, 
IHSDP projects were integrated in the City Development Plan (CDP). In our selected cities in Gujarat, 
IHSDP was not prominent; slum upgrading and relocations were financed through state schemes and 
own funds.  
 
Figure 3: Central investment in slum habitat infrastructure under IHSDP (in Rs. crore, as per 
15.11.2015) 
Source: JNNURM website (National Informatics Centre, Government of India, n.d.) 
 
The stipulated 10%-matching of the central funds can represent a significant sum for ULBs, although 
municipalities can take recourse to soft loans offered by the Gujarat Municipal Finance board and by 
the Municipal Development Fund Trust in West Bengal, respectively. While the municipalities in 
Gujarat seemed able to forward the required matching funds, the state government in West Bengal 
supported local governments by increasing its own share to 15% of the cost of sanctioned projects, 
because “the ULBs are too poor”, as a state officer reported to us.  
 
3 State government schemes related to the urban environment 
The flow of funds for the improvement of the urban environment in small cities under state 
government schemes is more difficult to trace because of the multiplicity of schemes and the fact 
that these usually cover large metropolitan areas and small/medium towns at the same time. The 
main schemes in West Bengal were the Development of Municipal Areas (DMA) for infrastructure 
projects, Basic Minimum Services (BMS) for water supply, roads, education in non-metropolitan 
areas, the Urban Employment Schemes (UES) and the Employment Generation in Urban Areas 
(EGUA) program, as well as the Swarnim Jayanti Mukhya Mantri Shaheri Vikas Yojana (SJMMSVY) for 
water supply, toilets, housing, roads, transport, health centers, etc. and the Nirmal Gujarat Yojana 
(NGS) for sanitation and solid waste management in Gujarat. In both states, there were smaller 
additional schemes related to solid waste management, urban greenery and forestry, slum 
upgrading, water supply, etc.  
Our rough estimates based on official budget figures (Department of Municipal Affairs, Govt. of West 
Bengal, n.d.; Gujarat Municipal Finance Board, n.d.) indicate a yearly spending of about Rs. 1,000 
crore in West Bengal and of around 3,715 crore in Gujarat under the above-mentioned schemes. 
However, these figures are not fully comparable, as the West Bengal numbers do not include state 
State Allocation Funds released 
Ratio allocated / 
released funds 
No. constructions 
completed 
West Bengal 681 703 1.03 47,099 
Gujarat 256 247 0.96 14,422 
All India 6828 6432 0.94 338,845 
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government funds going through the Urban Development Department to UDAs instead of 
municipalities. Moreover, the figures refer to total budget estimates for all urban areas in the 
respective state; data on the proportion of budgets allocated to non-metropolitan areas was not 
available, except in the case of Gujarat’s SJMMSVY, of which only 15% went to small and medium 
towns, and West Bengal’s BMS, of which all funding went to non-metropolitan areas.  
 
Figure 4: (Planned) expenditure under various schemes related to urban environmental governance 
(in Rs. lakh) 
 
Bardhaman Medinipur Navsari Amreli 
UIDSSMT 100 290 N/A 0 
IHSDP 500 665 N/A 3 
Total centrally sponsored 
schemes 
600 995 N/A 3 
DMA 50 150 
  
BMS 76 300 
  
SWM Mission  0 100 
  
UES 363 300 
  
EGUA 87 115 
  
SJMMSVY 
  
N/A 245 
NGY 
  
N/A 0.4 
Total state government 
schemes 
576 965 N/A 245 
Sources: Municipal budget estimates 2013-14 (Bardhaman, Medinipur), Annual accounts 2011-12 
(Amreli). 
Indeed, our analysis of municipal budgets and accounts of the selected cities suggests that income 
through state government schemes (and from centrally sponsored schemes) was more important in 
the studied cities in West Bengal than in Gujarat (see figure 4). However, this comparison must be 
read with caution: the West Bengal figures derive from budget estimates (for 2013-14), those related 
to Gujarat from municipal accounts (for 2011-12); the listed schemes are not comparable and some 
schemes, particularly West Bengal’s employment programs, were also used for projects unrelated to 
urban environmental governance; and the budget and spending under a particular scheme can 
fluctuate greatly from one year to another, particularly in Gujarat where larger infrastructure 
projects were implemented (see figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Government grants to select municipalities in Gujarat, 2007-08 to 2011-12 (in Rs. lakh) 
Navsari 
 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
2011-
12 
Average 
 
State grants for urban 
development 
- 8 10 12 607 127.4 
 
UIDSSMT - - - - - 0  
All other centrally sponsored 
schemes 
- - 84 - - 16.8 
Amreli 
 
       
State grants for urban 
development 
2 1 82 70 245 80 
 
UIDSSMT 505 234 - - - 147.8  
All other centrally sponsored 
schemes 
262 33 - 115 7 83.4 
Source: Budget documents, Gujarat Urban Finance Board. 
 
Whatever the exact figures on state investments in environmental governance in the selected cities, 
our analysis points to qualitative differences in the two states. West Bengal generally favored 
employment-oriented programs. In Bardhaman and Medinipur, urban employment schemes were 
often used for small-scale water works, urban forestry and beautification but also for maintenance 
work (street sweeping and drainage), thus filling gaps in the municipal operation and maintenance 
budget for the upkeep of the urban environment. By contrast, the Government of Gujarat embarked 
on larger infrastructure projects. In Amreli, for example, a Rs. 50 crore water supply project had been 
recently completed and an underground drainage system had been sanctioned. 
 
4 State transfers of untied funds 
The Indian Constitution has prescribed the allocation of a share of tax income to the states since 
1951, but until the 1990s, the state’s allocations to local bodies was done “on a whim, on an ad-hoc 
basis”, as a state finance commissioner told us. Only the 74th Constitutional Amendment directed 
state governments to establish their own State Finance Commissions (SFC) responsible for fairly 
distributing a given share of the state tax income (from both central tax transfers and own taxes) to 
ULBs (and panchayats) according to a predetermined formula.  
The allocation formula is discussed and adjusted every five years, that is, with each new SFC, and 
with reference to the Central Finance Commission criteria used for the allocation to states. The 
transposition of the central criteria proved difficult as certain indicators (e.g., GDP, HDI) were not 
available at the disaggregated scale of individual cities. We were not able to get access to the actual 
formulas used in either state, but criteria used included not only population size, area, poverty rate 
and literacy rate but also financial discipline and own revenue-raising efforts. Generally, SFCs 
balanced between need-based allotments and incentive-based ones rewarding ‘good performance’. 
Also, the formulas were becoming more sophisticated as more disaggregated data was becoming 
available. 
The proportion of devolved funds to local bodies amounted to about 5% of the state’s net tax 
revenue. In West Bengal, some SFC allocations never reached the municipalities because the state 
government deducted some amount from the transfer to pay for the municipality’s outstanding bills, 
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particularly electricity bills, owed to state-government-owned utility companies. A state-level officer 
said that the state government would at the same time often fail to pay the property taxes that are 
due to the municipalities. While there seemed to be no such direct deductions in Gujarat, an official 
order lets the state government pay outstanding electricity bills for defaulting municipalities and 
have them pay back in instalments from grants.  
 
Figure 6: Transfers of untied funds to municipalities (in Rs. crore) 
 West Bengal Gujarat 
State Finance Commission 339 240 
Octroi compensation - c. 2,500 
Sources: Department of Municipal Affairs, West Bengal (budget estimates 2015-16); Gujarat 
Municipal Finance Board (revised budget provisions, 2014-15) 
 
Urban local bodies (ULBs) in Gujarat received additional transfers of untied funds beyond the 
allocations from the Central and State Finance Commission. Figure 6 indicates that while financial 
devolution through the SFC were similar in the two states (if corrected by urban population size), 
municipalities in Gujarat received a much larger amount of untied funds through ‘octroi 
compensation’. Octroi, the raising of a municipal tax for the entry of goods to the city, was an 
important traditional local revenue stream in the region of today’s Gujarat. It was abolished in the 
year 2000; ever since, the state government has compensated the municipalities for revenue losses 
from octroi. In West Bengal and the erstwhile Bengal presidency, the system of local octroi was 
absent.  
The flow of untied funds to our studied municipality was difficult to assess from the municipal 
accounts, as they appeared under different headings. However, figure 7 confirms the importance of 
the octroi compensation compared to the central and state finance commission transfers.  
 
Figure7: Receipt of untied funds in selected cities, 2011-12 (in Rs. lakh) 
 
Bardhaman Medinipur Navsari Amreli 
13th Central Finance Commission 137 77 N/A 129 
3rd State Finance Commission  153 75 N/A N/A 
Octroi Compensation - - N/A 545 
Sources: Municipal annual accounts, 2011-12. 
 
5 Own revenue 
According to data from the West Bengal Department of Municipal Affairs and the Gujarat Municipal 
Finance Board, own revenue raised by municipalities in West Bengal amounted to about Rs. 230 
crore in 2015-16 while it was more than Rs. 400 crore in Gujarat. This general picture is confirmed by 
data from our selected cities (see figure 8). It can be partly attributed to a stronger economic tax 
base in Gujarat, but equally to tax reforms and more taxation autonomy than in West Bengal.   
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Figure 8: Revenue from own sources, selected cities, 2011-12 (West Bengal) and 2012-13 (Gujarat) 
 
Bardhaman Medinipur Navsari Amreli 
Revenue (in Rs. lakh) 1,156 622 1,655 881 
Revenue per capita (in Rs.) 333 368 585 747 
Source: Municipal accounts 
 
Revenue from own sources include municipal incomes from various taxes, rents, fees, user charges, 
etc. In Gujarat, municipalities have the authority to set their own the rate of the property tax, the 
most important endogenous municipal revenue stream. In West Bengal, by contrast, municipal 
property tax rates are determined by a state-level institution, the Central Valuation Board. Moreover, 
a government declaration prevents municipalities in West Bengal to impose a separate water tax. 
However, low municipal revenues in West Bengal are not only a consequence of limited taxation 
authority but also of political disincentives and unwillingness of local elected officeholders to impose 
taxes. Raising own revenue proved to be politically difficult, except for taxes on mobile-phone 
towers, bus stands, rents, etc. Yet, Medinipur managed to introduce user charges on door-to-door 
collection of household wastes.  
 
6 Municipal expenditure 
Although municipalities in Gujarat reported fewer financial constraints than their counterparts in 
West Bengal, figure 9 indicates that the total expenditure per capita was not very different in the 
selected cities in the two states (the higher figure for Amreli may be conjunctural). However, 
Bardhaman and Medinipur had higher revenue expenditures (e.g., recurring expenses for operation 
and maintenance) and lower capital expenditures (e.g., asset-creating investments) than their 
counterparts in Gujarat. Particularly, the employment of ‘unskilled’ labor was very high in both 
Bardhaman and Medinipur.  
 
Fig. 9 Municipal expenditure in selected cities, 2011-12 (West Bengal) and 2012-13 (Gujarat) 
 
Bardhaman Medinipur Navsari Amreli 
Total expenditure (Rs. lakh) 5134 2585 2847 2287 
     Rs. per capita 1479 1526 1664 1903 
Capital expenditure (Rs. lakh) 1614 879 1535 1246 
     Rs. per capita 465 517 897 1051 
Revenue expenditure (Rs. lakh) 3520 1706 1312 1041 
     Rs. per capita 1014 1009 767 852 
Capital-revenue ratio 31:69 34:66 54:46 54:46 
Source: Municipal accounts 
 
The low ratios between capital and revenue expenditures, particularly in West Bengal, point to the 
difficulty of municipalities to make investments in the improvement of the urban infrastructure and 
environment, as expenses for operation and maintenance weigh heavily on their budgets. 
Unfortunately, we cannot nuance this claim with comparative data from municipal accounts of the 
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four cities. Expenditures on the urban environment (e.g., water supply, sanitation, solid waste 
management, parks) appear under different headings (e.g., particular schemes, salaries, vehicles) and 
can therefore not be estimated with confidence. The differing accounting systems and categories 
used between the four cities rendered the comparison impossible. As an illustration, however, figure 
10 presents data on capital and revenue expenditures for selected urban environmental services in 
Medinipur, where such data was better identifiable than from the accounts of the other three cities. 
 
Fig. 10 Expenditure on urban environmental services, Medinipur, 2011-12 (Rs. lakh) 
 Capital Revenue Total 
Water Supply 27 261 288 
Drainage and sewerage 45 101 146 
Conservancy (SWM) 0 379 379 
Total 72 741 813 
Source: Municipal accounts 
 
Figures 9 and 10 suggest that about one third of the municipal expenses in Medinipur were spent on 
environmental services. This is, however, a gross underestimation as both investments and 
maintenance related to the urban environment were done under other accounting categories and 
through government schemes (e.g., the West Bengal Urban Employment Scheme) that are not 
accounted for in figure 10. Yet, the high (revenue) expenditures for the urban environment are still 
remarkable, particularly those for conservancy work (mostly wages for waste collectors and 
sweepers). The revenue expenses for water supply include wages for maintenance and repairs but 
also electricity bills for the operation of pumps lifting water from the Kasai river to overhead tanks. 
The small capital expenses in 2011-12 were made on new installations of tube wells and community 
taps. However, in 2012-13 already, Rs. 70 lakh were spent under a state government scheme, 
seemingly for the preparation of an inter-municipal water supply project.  
 
7 Municipal staffing 
Figure 11 gives an overview of the staffing situation in the selected cities indicating a higher 
proportional municipal staffing level in West Bengal than in Gujarat. In both states, posts at the 
municipality are sanctioned by the state government: in Gujarat by the Department of Urban 
Development and based on the size class of the city; in West Bengal by the Municipal Service 
Commission based on population and needs criteria. In Gujarat, no adjustments to increased 
population size had been made since the early 1970s; in West Bengal, there had even been efforts to 
reduce the number of sanctioned posts. In Bardhaman, for example, a reduction from 1221 to 680 
posts was proposed in 1995 but contested by the municipality. Waste work accounts for a large 
proportion of municipal employment: Bardhaman employed 576 persons in this sector, Medinipur 
222 and Navasari 247.  
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Figure 11: Municipal staff in selected cities 
 
Bardhaman Medinipur Navsari 
Allocated posts (permanent) 1221 1002 786 
Permanent staff 871 346  
761 
Temporary staff (contract 
staff, casual workers) 
600 462 
Vacant posts 169 194 25 
Total staff 1471 808 761 
Staff per 10K population 42 48 27 
Source: Fieldwork, 2013-14 
 
Figure 11 also points to a high number of vacant positions in West Bengal. The government often did 
not replace retired and deceased municipal workers in permanent positions, particularly ‘unskilled’ 
class IV workers (e.g., waste workers). As the state government did not react to appeals, the 
municipalities increasingly hired workers on a casual or contractual basis. The payment of salaries 
and benefits is largely covered from the municipal budget, including from money channeled through 
development schemes. For example, Bardhaman employed five additional waste workers per ward 
from the West Bengal Urban Employment Scheme to fill the gaps. Some work also got outsourced. In 
Gujarat, interviewees did not point to workforce problems. It seems that much work was outsourced. 
In Amreli, neighborhood organizations were sometimes called upon to collect and remove wastes.  
 
8 Conclusions 
This review of state-level and municipal accounts and budgets reveals that tied funding through 
government schemes was more important for investments in the urban environment in small cities in 
West Bengal while untied funding was comparatively more important in Gujarat. However, ULBs in 
West Bengal were sometimes able to fill gaps in the municipal budget through the strategic use of 
(employment-oriented) state government schemes. While we do not have exact figures, our data 
indicates that municipalities spent a significant proportion of their budget (certainly more than 30%) 
for urban environmental services, including solid waste management, water supply and sanitation. 
Particularly in West Bengal, revenue expenses (salaries, operation and maintenance costs) for the 
upkeep of the urban environment and urban environmental services by far outweighed capital 
investments for new infrastructure. Generally, staffing levels and flows of funds to small 
municipalities outside metropolitan regions are very limited. However, our qualitative analysis based 
on interviews (published elsewhere) shows that municipal agency is impeded not only by inadequate 
flows of (untied) resources and limited fiscal powers (which are more important obstacles in West 
Bengal), but also by other structural constraints such as the presence of parastatal agencies 
bypassing ULBs, the sway of government officers over elected councilors, and the lack of 
decentralized planning, of which the latter two are more predominant in Gujarat than in West 
Bengal. 
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